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Abstract
This paper considers a linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field control problem involving a major
player and a large number of minor players, where the dynamics and costs depend on random
parameters. The objective is to optimize a social cost as a weighted sum of the individual costs under
decentralized information. We apply the person-by-person optimality principle in team decision
theory to the finite population model to construct two limiting variational problems whose solutions,
subject to the requirement of consistent mean field approximations, yield a system of forward-
backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We show the existence and uniqueness of a
solution to the FBSDEs and obtain decentralized strategies nearly achieving social optimality in
the original large but finite population model.
Keywords: Mean field control, mean field approximation, person-by-person optimality,
social optimum, decentralized control
Abbreviated title: Mean field social optimization
1 Introduction
Mean field dynamic decision problems have been extensively studied in the literature [5, 9, 11, 19, 20,
21, 29, 30, 40], and a central goal is to obtain decentralized strategies based on limited information for
individual agents. In a noncooperative game theoretic context, decentralized solutions are developed
in [19, 21] by applying consistent mean field approximations.
In a basic mean field decision model, all players (or agents) have comparably small influence and
may be called peers. A modified modeling framework is to introduce one or a few major players
interacting with a large number of minor players. Traditionally, models differentiating the strength of
players have been studied in cooperative game theory, and they are customarily called mixed games
with the players according called mixed players [16]; such literature only dealt with static models.
The work [17] investigates an LQ mean field game involving a major player. The consideration of
∗M. Huang is with the School of Mathematics and Statistics, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada
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major and minor players in mean field control has attracted considerable interest addressing different
nonlinear modeling aspects [8, 12, 35]. See [4, 33] for extension to hierarchical games, and [27] for the
analysis of evolutionary games and their deterministic mean field limit under a principle agent.
On the other hand, cooperation in dynamic multi-agent decision problems is traditionally a well
studied subject. For general cooperative differential games using various optimality notions, see [39,
41, 44]. Naturally, cooperative decision making in mean field models is of interest, especially from the
point of view of addressing complexity [20, 40]. Such decision problems may be referred to as mean
field teams for which the decision makers will also be called players or agents. The work [20] introduced
an LQ social optimization problem where all the agents cooperatively minimize a social cost as the
sum of their individual costs, and it shows that the consistency based approach in mean field games
may be extended to this model by combining with a person-by-person optimality principle in team
decision theory [24, 42]. The central result is the so-called social optimality theorem which states that
the optimality loss of the obtained decentralized strategies becomes negligible when the population
size goes to infinity [20]. The social optimum may be regarded as a specific Pareto optimum for the
constituent agents. A mean field team is studied in [43] where a Markov jump parameter appears as a
common source of randomness for all agents. An LQ mean field team is formulated in [2] by assuming
mean field (i.e. the average state of the population) sharing for a given population size N , which
gives an optimal control problem with special partial state information. In a mixed player setting, [8]
considers a nonlinear diffusion model and assumes that all minor players act as a team to minimize a
common cost against the major player. Optimal control of McKean–Vlasov dynamics is analyzed in
[28] and under some conditions it is shown that the optimal solution may be interpreted as the limit of
the social optimum solution of N -players as N →∞. Cooperative mean field control has applications
in economic theory [36], collective motion control [1, 38], and power grids [13]. Furthermore, social
optima are useful for studying efficiency of mean field games by providing a performance benchmark
[3, 18].
For mean field teams with mixed players, the analysis in an LQ framework has been formulated
in our earlier work [22], where partial analysis was presented by applying a state space augmentation
technique to characterize the dynamics of the random mean field evolution. Later, [23] re-examined the
problem by applying the person-by-person optimality principle adopted for the peer model in [20]. This
paper further generalizes the model by including coupling in dynamics and random coefficients while
[22] only considers cost coupling and deterministic coefficients. Specifically, the model parameters now
depend on the Brownian motion of the major player. This suggests that the major player serves as
a common source of randomness for all players, which has connections with mean field games with
common noise [5, 10, 11]. In fact, the stochastic control literature [7, 37] has considered a similar
randomness structure where the system coefficients depend on a smaller filtration, and such modeling
has applications in finance [26, 31].
As in [23], our solution is to extend the person-by-person optimality argument of [20] to the current
setting to deal with random mean field approximations due to the presence of the major player, and we
solve two variational problems resulting from the major-minor player interactions. The linear backward
stochastic differential equation (BSDE) [6, 32] technique adopted in this paper can treat the random
mean field and coefficients in a unified manner. As it turns out, the consideration of the coupling in
dynamics will necessitate delicate handling of a two-scale variational problem for the minor player.
Note that for the person-by-person optimality principle only one player has control perturbation.
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This feature is similar to mean field games where the equilibrium is tested by unilateral strategy
changes. However, our performance characterization of social optimality must allow simultaneous
control variations. The optimal control nature of our problem shares some similarity with mean field
type optimal control [14, 45]. However, the later involves only a single decision maker which directly
controls the state mean.
Throughout this paper, we use (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ) to denote an underlying filtered probability
space. Let Sn be the Euclidean space of n× n real and symmetric matrices, Sn+ its subset of positive
semi-definite matrices, and Ik the k × k identity matrix. The Banach space L2F (0, T ;Rk) consists
of all Rk-valued Ft-adapted square integrable processes {v(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T} with the norm ‖v‖L2
F
=
(E
∫ T
0 |v(t)|2dt)1/2. The Banach space L∞F (0, T ;Rk) consists of all Rk-valued Ft-adapted essentially
bounded processes {v(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T} with the norm ‖v‖L∞
F
= ess supt,ω |v(t)|. We can similarly define
such spaces with other choices of the filtration and the Euclidean space. Given a symmetric matrix
M ≥ 0, the quadratic form zTMz may be denoted as |z|2M . For a matrix Z, Zcoli stands for the ith
column of Z. Some variables (such as X⋆0 (t), u
⋆
i (t)) with a superscript of star are used for limiting
models afer taking mean field approximations. Let {FWt , t ≥ 0} be the filtration by a Brownian
motion {W (t), t ≥ 0}. We use C (or C1, etc.) to denote a generic constant which is independent of
the population size N + 1 and may change from place to place.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formulates the social optimization problem
with a major player. Sections 3 and 4 introduce two variational problems with random parameters
for the major player and a representative minor player, respectively. The existence and uniqueness
of the mean field social optimum solution is presented in section 5. An asymptotic social optimality
theorem is established in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Mean Field Social Optimization Model
Consider the LQ mean field decision model with a major player A0 and minor players {Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}.
At time t ≥ 0, the states of A0 and Ai are, respectively, denoted by XN0 (t) and XNi (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
The dynamics of the N + 1 players are given by a system of linear stochastic differential equations
(SDEs):
dXN0 (t) =
[
A0(t)X
N
0 (t) +B0(t)u
N
0 (t) + F0(t)X
(N)(t)
]
dt+D0(t)dW0(t), (2.1)
dXNi (t) =
[
A(t)XNi (t) +B(t)u
N
i (t) + F (t)X
(N)(t) +G(t)XN0 (t)
]
dt+D(t)dWi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
(2.2)
where X(N)(t) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1X
N
i (t) is the coupling term. The states X
N
0 , X
N
i and controls u
N
0 ,
uNi are, respectively, n and n1 dimensional vectors. The initial states X
N
0 (0) = z0, X
N
i (0) = x
N
i0 ,
1 ≤ i ≤ N , are deterministic. The coefficients in the dynamics are random. The noise processes W0,
Wi are n2 dimensional independent standard Brownian motions adapted to Ft. We choose Ft as the σ-
algebra FWt := σ(Wj(τ), 0 ≤ j ≤ N, τ ≤ t). Denote W0 = [W01, . . . ,W0n2 ]T , FW0t := σ(W0(τ), τ ≤ t),
and FW0,Wit := σ(W0(τ),Wi(τ), τ ≤ t).
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For 0 ≤ j ≤ N , denote uN−j =
(
uN0 , . . . , u
N
j−1, u
N
j+1, . . . , u
N
N
)
. The cost for A0 is given by
J0(u
N
0 , u
N
−0) = E
∫ T
0
{∣∣XN0 (t)−Ψ0(X(N)(t))∣∣2Q0(t) + (uN0 (t))TR0(t)uN0 (t)}dt
+ E|XN0 (T )−H0,fX(N)(T )− η0f |2Q0f , (2.3)
where Ψ0(X
(N)(t)) = H0(t)X
(N)(t) + η0(t). The cost for Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is given by
Ji(u
N
i , u
N
−i) = E
∫ T
0
{∣∣XNi (t)−Ψ(XN0 (t),X(N)(t))∣∣2Q(t) + (uNi (t))TR(t)uNi (t)}dt
+ E|XNi (T )−H1fXN0 (T )−H2fX(N)(T )− ηf |2Qf , (2.4)
where Ψ(XN0 (t),X
(N)(t)) = H1(t)X
N
0 (t)+H2(t)X
(N)(t)+η(t). The termsH1(t)X
N
0 (t) andH1fX
N
0 (T )
indicate the strong influence of the major player. Also, the parameters in the two costs are random.
Below we list the stochastic parameter processes
{A0(t), B0(t), F0(t), D0(t), A(t), B(t), F (t), G(t), D(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, (2.5)
{H0(t), H1(t), H2(t), Q0(t), Q(t), R0(t), R(t), η0(t), η(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T}. (2.6)
We introduce the standing assumptions for this paper.
(A1) We have
A0, F0, A, F,G,H0,H1,H2 ∈ L∞FW0 (0, T ;Rn×n),
B0, B ∈ L∞FW0 (0, T ;Rn×n1), D0,D ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn×n2),
η0, η ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn),
and
Q0, Q ∈ L∞FW0 (0, T ;Sn), Q0(t) ∈ Sn+, Q(t) ∈ Sn+, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
R0, R ∈ L∞FW0 (0, T ;Sn1), R0(t) ≥ c1In1 , R(t) ≥ c1In1 , ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
where c1 > 0 is a fixed deterministic constant.
(A2) The terminal cost parameters
H0f , Q0f , H1f , H2f , Qf , (2.7)
are FW0T -measurable and essentially bounded, and Q0f , Qf are Sn+-valued. η0f and ηf are FW0T -
measurable and square integrable.
(A3) There exists a constant c2 > 0 independent of N such that supj≥0 |xNj0| ≤ c2 for the initial
states, and limN→∞ x
(N)
0 = m0, where x
(N)
0 =
1
N
∑N
i=1 x
N
i0 .
By (A1)–(A2), there exists a fixed constant c3 such that
ess sup
t,ω
|ψ(t)| ≤ c3, ess sup
ω
|ψf | ≤ c3,
where ψ(t) (resp., ψf ) stands for any entry in (2.5)–(2.6) (resp., (2.7)).
For the rest of the paper, for a stochastic process {Z(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T} appearing in various equations
and equalities, we may write Z for Z(t) by suppressing the time variable t for which the interpretation
should be clear from the context. For instance, we often drop t in A0(t), B0(t), X
N
i (t), Q(t), etc.
Throughout the paper, we denote Y (N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 Yi, and Y
(N)
−i =
1
N
∑N
j 6=i Yj for N vectors
Y1, . . . , YN .
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2.1 The mean field social optimization problem
For the mean field social optimization problem, we attempt to minimize the following social cost
J (N)soc (u) = J0 +
λ
N
N∑
k=1
Jk, (2.8)
where uN = (uN0 , u
N
1 , . . . , u
N
N ) and λ > 0. It is necessary to introduce the scaling factor λ/N in order
to obtain a well defined limiting problem when N tends to infinity. In view of the dynamics and costs
of the N + 1 players, J0 and Ji, i ≥ 1, are generally of the same order of magnitude. If λ/N were
replaced by 1, the limiting control problem would be too insensitive to the performance of the major
player and become inappropriate.
For the model of N + 1 players, let the optimal control be denoted by
uˇN =
(
uˇN0 , uˇ
N
1 , . . . , uˇ
N
N
)
, (2.9)
where each uˇj belongs to L
2
F (0, T ;R
n1). Since the optimal control problem minimizing J
(N)
soc is a
strictly convex optimization problem with J
(N)
soc →∞ as ‖uN‖L2
F
→∞, such uˇN exists and is unique.
However, this solution is not what we desire to obtain since each player needs centralized information.
Instead, it will serve as a starting point for designing decentralized strategies.
3 The Major Player’s Variational Problem
Consider the variation u˜N0 ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1) and uN0 = uˇN0 + u˜N0 . Let the state processes (XˇNj )Nj=0
correspond to (uˇNj )
N
j=0, and (X
N
j )
N
j=0 correspond to (uˇ
N
0 + u˜
N
0 , uˇ
N
1 , . . . , uˇ
N
N ). Write X
N
j = Xˇ
N
j + X˜
N
j
for 0 ≤ j ≤ N , where X˜Nj is the state variation of player Aj. Then
dXN0 (t) = (A0X
N
0 + F0X
(N) +B0u
N
0 )dt+D0dW0(t),
dX(N)(t) = [(A+ F )X(N) +Buˇ(N) +GXN0 ]dt+
D
N
N∑
i=1
dWi(t),
and
dX˜N0 (t) = (A0X˜
N
0 + F0X˜
(N) +B0u˜
N
0 )dt,
dX˜(N)(t) = [(A+ F )X˜(N) +GX˜N0 ]dt,
where X˜N0 (0) = X˜
(N)(0) = 0. Note that we have followed the convention of dropping the time variable
t in various places. It can be checked that X˜Ni = X˜
(N) on [0, T ] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Denote
δLN0 (t) =
{
[XˇN0 −
(
H0Xˇ
(N) + η0
)
]TQ0
(
X˜N0 −H0X˜(N)
)
+
(
uˇN0
)T
R0u˜
N
0
+ λ[(I −H2)Xˇ(N) −H1XˇN0 − η]TQ[(I −H2)X˜(N) −H1X˜N0 ]
}
(t),
and
δLN0f =
{
[XˇN0 −
(
H0f Xˇ
(N) + η0f
)
]TQ0f
(
X˜N0 −H0fX˜(N)
)
+ λ[(I −H2f )Xˇ(N) −H1f XˇN0 − ηf ]TQf [(I −H2f )X˜(N) −H1f X˜N0 ]
}
(T ).
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The first variation of the social cost is given by
δJ0 +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
δJi = 2E
∫ T
0
δLN0 (t)dt+ 2EδL
N
0f ,
which is a linear functional of u˜N0 . We have the first order variational condition:
Lemma 3.1 We have
E
∫ T
0
δLN0 (t)dt+ EδL
N
0f = 0, ∀ u˜N0 ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1).
Proof. We prove by using the so called person-by-person optimality principle [24]. Take a constant
ǫ and let u˜N0 be fixed. Then consider the control (uˇ
N
0 + ǫu˜
N
0 , uˇ
N
1 , . . . , uˇ
N
N ) for the players. It follows
that
J (N)soc (uˇ
N
0 + ǫu˜
N
0 , uˇ
N
1 , . . . , uˇ
N
N ) ≥ J (N)soc (uˇN0 , uˇN1 , . . . , uˇNN )
for all ǫ, and the lemma follows from elementary estimates of the left hand side after an expansion
around uˇ0. 
3.1 The limiting variational problem for the major player
Consider the limiting model
dX⋆0 (t) = (A0X
⋆
0 +B0u
⋆
0 + F0m)dt+D0dW0(t),
dm(t) = [(A+ F )m+Bu¯+GX⋆0 ]dt,
where X⋆0 (0) = X
N
0 (0), m(0) = m0, and u¯ ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1). Here u¯ and m are used to approximate
uˇ(N) and X(N) for large N , respectively. Note that each uˇj ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1) is a centralized control in
that it depends on all Brownian motions. However, as N →∞, we expect the randomness originated
in (W1, . . . ,WN ) will be averaged out. This has motivated the consideration of u¯ ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1).
For a particular control uˆ⋆0 ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1), let the associated state process be
dXˆ⋆0 (t) = (A0Xˆ
⋆
0 +B0uˆ
⋆
0 + F0mˆ)dt+D0dW0(t),
dmˆ(t) = [(A+ F )mˆ+Bu¯+GXˆ⋆0 ]dt,
where Xˆ⋆0 (0) = X
N
0 (0) and mˆ(0) = m0. The state variations read
dX˜⋆0 (t) = (A0X˜
⋆
0 + F0m˜+B0u˜
⋆
0)dt,
dm˜(t) = [(A+ F )m˜+GX˜⋆0 ]dt,
where X˜⋆0 (0) = 0, m˜(0) = 0, and u˜
⋆
0 ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1) is the control variation.
Denote
K0(t) = −Q0H0 − λHT1 Q(I −H2),
M0(t) = Q0 + λH
T
1 QH1,
M(t) = HT0 Q0H0 + λ(I −H2)TQ(I −H2),
ν0(t) = λH
T
1 Qη −Q0η0,
ν(t) = HT0 Q0η0 + λH
T
2 Qη − λQη,
Rλ(t) = λR,
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where the time variable t in various places of the right hand sides is suppressed. For the terminal cost,
similarly define
K0f = −Q0fH0f − λHT1fQf (I −H2f ),
M0f = Q0f + λH
T
1fQfH1f ,
Mf = H
T
0fQ0fH0f + λ(I −H2f )TQf (I −H2f ),
ν0f = λH
T
1fQfηf −Q0fη0f ,
νf = H
T
0fQ0fη0f + λH
T
2fQfηf − λQfηf .
Define
δL⋆0(t) =
{[
Xˆ⋆0 −
(
H0mˆ+ η0
)]T
Q0(X˜
⋆
0 −H0m˜) + (uˆ⋆0)TR0u˜⋆0
+ λ[(I −H2)mˆ−H1Xˆ⋆0 − η]TQ[
(
I −H2
)
m˜−H1X˜⋆0 ]
}
(t)
=
{
(X˜⋆0 )
T (M0Xˆ
⋆
0 +K0mˆ+ ν0) + m˜
T (KT0 Xˆ
⋆
0 +Mmˆ+ ν) + (uˆ
⋆
0)
TR0u˜
⋆
0
}
(t),
δL⋆0f = {(X˜⋆0 )T (M0f Xˆ⋆0 +K0f mˆ+ ν0f ) + m˜T (KT0f Xˆ⋆0 +Mfmˆ+ νf )}(T ),
which are intended to approximate δLN0 (t) and δL
N
0f , respectively.
Variational Problem (I) VP–(I): Find uˆ⋆0 ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1) such that
E
∫ T
0
δL⋆0(t)dt+EδL
⋆
0f = 0, ∀ u˜⋆0 ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1). (3.1)
We call uˆ⋆0 or (uˆ
⋆
0, Xˆ
⋆
0 , mˆ) a solution of VP–(I).
Suppose (uˆ⋆0, Xˆ
⋆
0 , mˆ) is a solution to VP–(I). We introduce the backward stochastic differential
equations (BSDEs)
dp0(t) = (M0Xˆ
⋆
0 +K0mˆ−AT0 p0 −GT p+ ν0)dt+ ξ0dW0(t), (3.2)
dp(t) = [KT0 Xˆ
⋆
0 +Mmˆ− F T0 p0 − (A+ F )T p+ ν]dt+ ξdW0(t), (3.3)
where
p0(T ) = −(M0f Xˆ⋆0 (T ) +K0f mˆ(T ) + ν0f ), p(T ) = −(KT0f Xˆ⋆0 (T ) +Mfmˆ(T ) + νf ). (3.4)
Lemma 3.2 If (uˆ⋆0, Xˆ
⋆
0 , mˆ) is a solution to VP–(I), then (3.2)–(3.3) has a unique solution (p0, p, ξ0, ξ)
in L2FW0 (0, T ;R
2n)× L2FW0 (0, T ;R2n×n2), and uˆ⋆0(t) = R−10 (t)BT0 (t)p0(t).
Proof. From the linear BSDEs, we can solve a unique solution (p0, p, ξ0, ξ). It follows from Itoˆ’s
formula that
d[pT0 (t)X˜
⋆
0 (t) + p
T (t)m˜(t)]
= pT0 (A0X˜
⋆
0 + F0m˜+B0u˜
⋆
0)dt+ p
T [(A+ F )m˜+GX˜⋆0 ]dt
+ (X˜⋆0 )
T (M0Xˆ
⋆
0 +K0mˆ−AT0 p0 −GT p+ ν0)dt+ (X˜⋆0 )T ξ0dW0(t)
+ m˜T [KT0 Xˆ
⋆
0 +Mmˆ− F T0 p0 − (A+ F )T p+ ν]dt+ m˜T ξdW0(t).
7
Since X˜⋆i (0) = m˜(0) = 0, this implies
E
[
pT0 (T )X˜
⋆
0 (T ) + p
T (T )m˜(T )
]
= E
∫ T
0
[pT0B0u˜
⋆
0 + (X˜
⋆
0 )
T (M0Xˆ
⋆
0 +K0mˆ+ ν0) + m˜
T (KT0 Xˆ
⋆
0 +Mmˆ+ ν)]dt. (3.5)
It follows from (3.1) and (3.5) that for any u˜⋆0 ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1),
E
∫ T
0
(u˜⋆0)
T
(
BT0 p0 −R0uˆ⋆0
)
dt = 0. (3.6)
The lemma follows. 
Given u¯ ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1), denote the forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE)
dXˆ⋆0 (t) = (A0Xˆ
⋆
0 +B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 p0 + F0mˆ)dt+D0dW0(t),
dmˆ(t) = [(A+ F )mˆ+Bu¯+GXˆ⋆0 ]dt,
dp0(t) =
(
M0Xˆ
⋆
0 +K0mˆ−AT0 p0 −GT p+ ν0
)
dt+ ξ0dW0(t),
dp(t) = [KT0 Xˆ
⋆
0 +Mmˆ− F T0 p0 − (A+ F )T p+ ν]dt+ ξdW0(t),
(3.7)
where Xˆ⋆0 (0) = X
N
0 (0), mˆ(0) = m0, p0(T ) = −(M0f Xˆ⋆0 (T ) +K0f mˆ(T ) + ν0f ), p(T ) = −(KT0f Xˆ⋆0 (T ) +
Mfmˆ(T ) + νf ).
To analyze (3.7), we introduce the notation:
X0 =
[
Xˆ⋆0
mˆ
]
, Y0 =
[
p0
p
]
, Z0 =
[
ξ0
ξ
]
, A0 =
[
A0 F0
G A+ F
]
, B0 =
[
B0
0
]
, (3.8)
B =
[
0
B
]
, D0 =
[
D0
0
]
, Q0 =
[
M0 K0
KT0 M
]
, v0 =
[
ν0
ν
]
, (3.9)
Q0f =
[
M0f K0f
KT0f Mf
]
, v0f =
[
ν0f
νf
]
. (3.10)
Lemma 3.3 Q0(t) and Q0f are positive semi-definite for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. Since Q0(t), Q(t) are symmetric and Q0(t), Q(t) ≥ 0, we can write Q0(t) = UT0 (t)U0(t) and
Q(t) = UT (t)U(t) for some Rn×n-valued random matrices U0(t), U(t). Denote
U0(t) =
[
U0 −U0(t)H0
0 0
]
(t), U(t) =
√
λ
[
UH1 −U
(
I −H2
)
0 0
]
(t).
It is clear that Q0(t) is symmetric and
Q0(t) =
[
Q0 −Q0H0
−HT0 Q0 HT0 Q0H0
]
(t) + λ
[
HT1 QH1 −HT1 Q
(
I −H2
)
−(I −H2)TQH1 (I −H2)TQ(I −H2)
]
(t)
= UT0 (t)U0(t) + U
T (t)U(t) ≥ 0.
The case of Q0f can be similarly checked. 
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Theorem 3.4 i) For any u¯ ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1), (3.7) has a unique solution (Xˆ⋆0 , mˆ, p0, p, ξ0, ξ) in
L2FW0 (0, T ;R
4n)× L2FW0 (0, T ;R2n×n2).
ii) VP-(I) has a unique solution given by
uˆ⋆0(t) = R
−1
0 (t)B
T
0 (t)p0(t). (3.11)
Proof. i) We rewrite (3.7) in the formdX0(t) =
(
A0X0 + B0R
−1
0 B
T
0Y0 + Bu¯
)
(t)dt+ D0(t)dW0(t),
dY0(t) =
(
Q0X0 − AT0Y0 + v0
)
(t)dt+ Z0(t)dW0(t),
where Y0(T ) = −Q0fX0(T ) − v0f . Under (A1)–(A2) and in view of Lemma 3.3, we apply Lemma
A.2 to obtain the existence and uniqueness of a solution.
ii) We solve (3.7) and choose uˆ⋆0 by (3.11). Such a control uˆ
⋆
0 ensures (3.6) while (3.5) still holds;
this further implies (3.1). Hence, uˆ⋆0 is a solution to VP–(I).
On the other hand, if (uˆ⋆0, Xˆ0, mˆ) is a solution to VP–(I) such that (3.1) holds, by Lemma 3.2,
(3.7) holds and is uniquely solved, and uniqueness of uˆ⋆0 follows from its representation in Lemma
3.2. 
4 The Minor Player’s Variational Problem
Recall that the control uˇ yields state processes XˇNj , j = 0, . . . , N . Now consider the control (u
N
i , uˇ
N
−i)
for a fixed i ≥ 1. Note that the state of player Aj, 1 ≤ j 6= i ≤ N , is affected even if only uˇNi changes
to uNi . Under (u
N
i , uˇ
N
−i), the state process of player Aj, 1 ≤ j 6= i ≤ N , is
dXNj (t) = (AX
N
j +Buˇ
N
j + FX
(N) +GXN0 )dt+DdWj(t).
Thus,
dXN0 (t) =
(
A0X
N
0 +B0uˇ
N
0 + F0X
(N)
−i +
1
NF0X
N
i
)
dt+D0dW0(t),
dX
(N)
−i (t) =
[(
A+ F
)
X
(N)
−i +Buˇ
(N)
−i +
1
NFX
N
i +GX
N
0
]
dt
+ DN
∑
j 6=i
dWNj (t)− 1N
(
FX
(N)
−i +
1
NFX
N
i +GX
N
0
)
dt,
dXNi (t) =
(
AXNi +Bu
N
i + FX
(N)
−i +GX
N
0
)
dt+DdWi(t) +
1
NFX
N
i dt,
where we use the notation Y
(N)
−i =
1
N
∑N
j 6=i Yj.
Let X˜Nj , 0 ≤ j ≤ N , denote the state variations caused by u˜Ni . The state variation of Aj,
1 ≤ j 6= i ≤ N , is
dX˜Nj (t) =
(
AX˜Nj + FX˜
(N)
−i +
1
NFX˜
N
i +GX˜
N
0
)
dt,
where X˜Nj (0) = 0. This implies X˜
N
j = X˜
N
j′ for all 1 ≤ j, j′ 6= i. Now,
dX˜N0 (t) =
(
A0X˜
N
0 + F0X˜
(N)
−i + F0
X˜Ni
N
)
dt,
dX˜
(N)
−i (t) =
[(
A+ F
)
X˜
(N)
−i + F
X˜Ni
N +GX˜
N
0
]
dt− 1N
(
FX˜
(N)
−i + F
X˜Ni
N +GX˜
N
0
)
dt,
dX˜Ni (t) = (AX˜
N
i +Bu˜
N
i )dt+
(
FX˜
(N)
−i + F
X˜Ni
N +GX˜
N
0
)
dt, (4.1)
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where X˜N0 (0) = X˜
(N)
−i (0) = X˜
N
i (0) = 0, and u˜
N
i ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1).
Lemma 4.1 There exists a constant C independent of N such that
sup
0≤t≤T
E
(∣∣X˜N0 (t)∣∣2 + ∣∣X˜(N)−i (t)∣∣2 + 1N2 ∣∣X˜Ni (t)∣∣2) ≤ CN2E
∫ T
0
|u˜Ni (t)|2dt.
Proof. By solving the linear ODE of (X˜N0 , X˜
(N)
−i , X˜
N
i /N), we first have a uniform bound estimate on
the fundamental solution matrix on [0, T ] and next obtain the estimate
sup
0≤t≤T
(|X˜N0 (t)|+ |X˜(N)−i (t)|+ |X˜Ni (t)/N |) ≤
C
N
∫ T
0
|u˜Ni (s)|ds. (4.2)
The lemma follows by applying Schwarz inequality. 
Remark 4.2 It is seen that (X˜N0 , X˜
(N)
−i ) and X˜
N
i have two different scales.
When the control changes from (uˇNi , uˇ
N
−i) to (uˇ
N
i + u˜
N
i , uˇ
N
−i), the first variations of the costs have
the following form
1
2
δJ0 = E
∫ T
0
χ0(t)dt+ Eχ0f ,
λ
2N
δJi = E
∫ T
0
χi(t)dt+ Eχif ,
λ
2N
∑
1≤j 6=i
δJj = E
∫ T
0
χ−i(t)dt+ Eχ−if ,
where
χ0 =
[
XˇN0 −
(
H0Xˇ
(N) + η0
)]T
Q0
(
X˜N0 −H0X˜(N)−i − 1NH0X˜Ni
)
,
χi =
[
XˇNi −
(
H1Xˇ
N
0 +H2Xˇ
(N) + η
)]T 1
N λQ
(
X˜Ni −H1X˜N0 −H2X˜(N)−i − 1NH2X˜Ni
)
+
(
uˇNi
)T 1
N λRu˜
N
i ,
χ−i =
[(
I −H2
)
Xˇ(N) −H1XˇN0 − η
]T
λQ
[(
I −H2
)
X˜
(N)
−i −H1X˜N0 − 1NH2X˜Ni
]
+ EN1 ,
and
χ0f =
[
XˇN0 −
(
H0fXˇ
(N) + η0f
)]T
Q0f
(
X˜N0 −H0fX˜(N)−i − 1NH0fX˜Ni
)
(T ),
χif =
[
XˇNi −
(
H1fXˇ
N
0 +H2fXˇ
(N) + ηf
)]T 1
N λQf
(
X˜Ni −H1fX˜N0 −H2fX˜(N)−i − 1NH2fX˜Ni
)
(T ),
χ−if =
[(
I −H2f
)
Xˇ(N) −H1fXˇN0 − ηf
]T
λQf
[(
I −H2f
)
X˜
(N)
−i −H1fX˜N0 − 1NH2fX˜Ni
]
(T ) + ENf .
In the above,
EN1 =− λN (XˇNi )TQ
[
(I −H2)X˜(N)−i −H1X˜N0 − 1NH2X˜Ni + 1N−1X˜
(N)
−i
]
+ λN−1(Xˇ
(N))TQX˜
(N)
−i
− λN (H1XˇN0 +H2Xˇ(N) + η)TQ
(
H1X˜
N
0 +H2X˜
(N)
−i +
1
NH2X˜
N
i
)
. (4.3)
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See appendix B for the derivation of (4.3). The derivation of ENf is similar and omitted here. We may
regard EN1 as a higher order term relative to the first term in χ−i. Specifically, by Lemma 4.1, we have
E|EN1 (t)| = O
(
1
N2
(
E[|XˇNi (t)|2 + |Xˇ(N)(t)|2 + |XˇN0 (t)|2]
)1/2(
E
∫ T
0
|u˜Ni (t)|2dt
)1/2)
.
We may give a similar upper bound for E|ENf | by using
(
E[|XˇNi (T )|2+ |Xˇ(N)(T )|2+ |XˇN0 (T )|2]
)1/2
in
place of the middle factor of O(·) above.
Proposition 4.3 We have
E
∫ T
0
(
χ0 + χi + χ−i
)
dt+ E(χ0f + χif + χ−if ) = 0, ∀u˜Ni ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.1 and we omit the detail. 
It can be shown that
χ0 + χi + χ−i
=
[
XˇN0 − (H0Xˇ(N) + η0)
]T
Q0
(
X˜N0 −H0X˜(N)−i − 1NH0X˜Ni
)
+
[
XˇNi − (H1XˇN0 +H2Xˇ(N) + η)
]T
1
N λQX˜
N
i + (uˇ
N
i )
T 1
N λRu˜
N
i
+
[
(I −H2)Xˇ(N) −H1XˇN0 − η
]T
λQ
[
(I −H2)X˜(N)−i −H1X˜N0 − 1NH2X˜Ni
]
+ EN2 ,
where EN2 can again be treated as a higher order term, and we may similarly rewrite χ0f +χif +χ−if .
4.1 Limiting variational problem for the minor player
Consider
dXˆ⋆0 (t) = (A0Xˆ
⋆
0 +B0uˆ
⋆
0 + F0mˆ)dt+D0dW0(t),
dmˆ(t) =
(
(A+ F )mˆ+Bu¯+GXˆ⋆0
)
dt,
dX⋆i (t) = (AX
⋆
i +Buˆ
⋆
i + Fmˆ+GXˆ
⋆
0 )dt+DdWi(t),
where uˆ⋆0 has been determined from the solution of VP–(I), and uˆ
⋆
i ∈ L2FW0,Wi (0, T ;Rn1).
Denote the state variational equations
dX˜⋆0 (t) =
(
A0X˜
⋆
0 + F0m˜+
1
NF0X˜
⋆
i
)
dt,
dm˜(t) =
[
(A+ F )m˜+ 1NFX˜
⋆
i +GX˜
⋆
0
]
dt,
dX˜⋆i (t) = (AX˜
⋆
i +Bu˜
⋆
i )dt,
(4.4)
where X˜⋆0 (0) = m˜(0) = X˜
⋆
i (0) = 0, and u˜
⋆
i ∈ L2FW0,Wi (0, T ;Rn1).
Remark 4.4 We see that (X˜⋆0 , m˜) and X˜
⋆
i have different scales when N increases, which is similar
to the case of (X˜N0 , X˜
(N)
−i ) and X˜
N
i .
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We give some motivation for introducing the two variational equations in (4.4) containing the
1/N factor. For large N , if the perturbation u˜Ni is small, J
(N)
soc has a change by the order of
(1/N)(E
∫ T
0 |u˜Ni |2ds)
1
2 . Thus we need to look at the optimizing behavior at a finer scale. For this
reason the two 1/N scaled terms in (4.4) are significant, and as it turns out below, they ensure that
(X˜⋆0 , m˜) provides a good approximation to (X˜
N
0 , X˜
(N)
−i ).
For approximating χ0 + χi + χ−i, denote
δL⋆i (t) =
{
[Xˆ⋆0 − (H0mˆ+ η0)]TQ0
(
X˜⋆0 −H0m˜− 1NH0X˜⋆i
)
+ [Xˆ⋆i − (H1Xˆ⋆0 +H2mˆ+ η)]T 1N λQX˜⋆i + (uˆ⋆i )T 1N λRu˜⋆i
+ [(I −H2)mˆ−H1Xˆ⋆0 − η]TλQ
[
(I −H2)m˜−H1X˜⋆0 − 1NH2X˜⋆i
]}
(t)
= (X˜⋆0 )
T (M0Xˆ
⋆
0 +K0mˆ+ ν0) + m˜
T (KT0 Xˆ
⋆
0 +Mmˆ+ ν)
+
(X˜⋆i )
T
N (K
T
0 Xˆ
⋆
0 + (M − λQ)mˆ+ λQXˆ⋆i + ν) + (uˆ⋆i )T 1N λRu˜⋆i .
In parallel to δL⋆i (t), we introduce a terminal variational term
δL⋆if =
{
(X˜⋆0 )
T (M0f Xˆ
⋆
0 +K0f mˆ+ ν0f ) + m˜
T (KT0f Xˆ
⋆
0 +Mfmˆ+ νf )
+
(X˜⋆i )
T
N (K
T
0f Xˆ
⋆
0 + (Mf − λQf )mˆ+ λQfXˆ⋆i + νf )
}
(T ).
Variational Problem II VP–(II): Find uˆ⋆i ∈ L2FW0,Wi (0, T ;Rn1) such that
E
∫ T
0
δL⋆i dt+ EδL
⋆
if = 0, ∀ u˜⋆i ∈ L2FW0,Wi (0, T ;Rn1).
The variational condition in VP–(II) may be regarded as an approximation of the person-by-person
optimality property as stated in Proposition 4.3. The proposition below gives insights into the limiting
variational problem VP–(II) and provides a justification for the form of (4.4).
Proposition 4.5 Let u˜Ni = u˜
⋆
i = v in (4.1) and (4.4) for some fixed v ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1). Then for
some constant C we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E
[
|X˜N0 (t)− X˜⋆0 (t)|2 + |X˜(N)−i (t)− m˜(t)|2 + | 1N X˜Ni (t)− 1N X˜⋆i (t)|2
]
≤ C
N4
.
Proof. Denote δ0(t) = X˜
N
0 − X˜⋆0 , δ−i(t) = X˜(N)−i − m˜, and δi(t) = X˜Ni − X˜⋆i . Then we write
dδ0(t) =
(
A0δ0 + F0δ−i + F0 δiN
)
dt,
dδ−i(t) =
[(
A+ F
)
δ−i + F δiN +Gδ0
]
dt− 1N
(
FX˜
(N)
−i + F
X˜Ni
N +GX˜
N
0
)
dt,
d δi(t)N = A
δi
N dt+
1
N
(
FX˜
(N)
−i + F
X˜Ni
N +GX˜
N
0
)
dt,
where δ0(0) = δ−i(0) = δi(0) = 0. By assumption (A1),
sup
0≤t≤T
|δ0 + δ−i + (δi/N)| ≤ C
N
sup
0≤t≤T
(|X˜(N)−i |+ |X˜Ni /N |+ |X˜N0 |). (4.5)
Recalling (4.2), the proposition follows. 
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For VP–(II) and the associated variational equations in (4.4), we try to identify adjoint processes
(q0, q, qi) such that the equality in VP–(II) is expressed only in terms of u˜
⋆
i and (Xˆ
⋆
0 , mˆ, Xˆ
⋆
i , uˆ
⋆
i ). Denote
dq0(t) = ψ11dt+ ψ12dW0(t) + ψ13dWi(t),
dq(t) = ψ21dt+ ψ22dW0(t) + ψ23dWi(t),
dqi(t) = ψ31dt+ ψ32dW0(t) + ψ33dWi(t),
where ψjk and q0(T ), q(T ), qi(T ) are to be determined. After elementary although tedious compu-
tations, it turns out that (q0, q) and (p0, p) in (3.7) are determined by exactly the same equations
and terminal conditions. Thus, we may use the adjoint processes (p0, p, qi) with the equation of qi
appropriately determined.
Let (Xˆ⋆0 , mˆ, p0, p) be solved first. After the above procedure of constructing the adjoint processes,
we introduce the equation system
dXˆ⋆0 (t) = (A0Xˆ
⋆
0 +B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 p0 + F0mˆ)dt+D0dW0(t),
dmˆ(t) = [(A+ F )mˆ+Bu¯+GXˆ⋆0 ]dt,
dXˆ⋆i (t) = (AXˆ
⋆
i +BR
−1
λ B
T qi + Fmˆ+GXˆ
⋆
0 )dt+DdWi(t),
dp0(t) = (M0Xˆ
⋆
0 +K0mˆ−AT0 p0 −GT p+ ν0)dt+ ξ0(t)dW0(t),
dp(t) = [KT0 Xˆ
⋆
0 +Mmˆ− F T0 p0 − (A+ F )T p+ ν]dt+ ξ(t)dW0(t),
dqi(t) =
[
KT0 Xˆ
⋆
0 + (M − λQ)mˆ+ λQXˆ⋆i − F T0 p0 − F T p−AT qi + ν
]
dt
+ζai(t)dW0(t) + ζbi(t)dWi(t),
(4.6)
where
Xˆ⋆0 (0) = X
N
0 (0), mˆ(0) = m0, Xˆ
⋆
i (0) = X
N
i (0),
p0(T ) = −(M0fXˆ⋆0 (T ) +K0f mˆ(T ) + ν0f ), p(T ) = −(KT0f Xˆ⋆0 (T ) +Mf mˆ(T ) + νf ),
qi(T ) = −(KT0f Xˆ⋆0 (T ) + (Mf − λQf )mˆ(T ) + λQfXˆ⋆i (T ) + νf ).
Theorem 4.6 Given u¯ ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1), (4.6) has a unique solution
(Xˆ⋆0 , mˆ, Xˆ
⋆
i , p0, p, qi, ξ0, ξ, ζai, ζbi)
such that
(Xˆ⋆0 , mˆ, p0, p, ξ0, ξ) ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;R4n)× L2FW0 (0, T ;R2n×n2),
(Xˆ⋆i , qi, ζai, ζbi) ∈ L2FW0,Wi (0, T ;R2n)× L2FW0,Wi (0, T ;R2n×n2),
and VP-(II) has a unique solution given by
uˆ⋆i (t) = R
−1
λ B
T qi(t). (4.7)
Proof. Note that (Xˆ⋆0 , mˆ, p0, p, ξ0, ξ) is uniquely determined by Theorem 3.4. To proceed, denote
χ1(t) = GXˆ
⋆
0 + Fmˆ,
χ2(t) = K
T
0 Xˆ
⋆
0 + (M − λQ)mˆ− F T0 p0 − F T p+ ν.
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We rewrite dXˆ⋆i (t) = (AXˆ⋆i +BR−1λ BT qi + χ1)dt+DdWi(t),dqi(t) = (λQXˆ⋆i −AT qi + χ2)dt+ ζai(t)dW0(t) + ζbi(t)dWi(t), (4.8)
for which we obtain a unique solution by using Lemma A.2 with the vector Brownian motion (W0,Wi).
We proceed to show that (4.7) is a solution to VP–(II), where the associated state processes are
Xˆ⋆0 , mˆ, Xˆ
⋆
i . Applying Itoˆ’s formula to d[(X˜
⋆
0 )
T p0 + m˜
T p+ (X˜⋆i /N)
T qi] gives the relation
E[(X˜⋆0 )
T p0 + m˜
T p+ (X˜⋆i /N)
T qi](T ) = E
∫ T
0
ψ(Xˆ⋆0 , mˆ, Xˆ
⋆
i , p0, p, qi)dt, (4.9)
where the integrand may be easily determined. Combining (4.9) with (4.7), we can show that uˆ⋆i
satisfies the variational condition in VP–(II). The proof of uniqueness is similar to part ii) of Theorem
3.4. This is done by showing that a solution to VP–(II) is necessarily represented as (4.7) via solving
(4.6). 
To further analyze (4.8), we introduce the backward stochastic Riccati differential equation (BSRDE)
− dPλ(t) = (PλA+ATPλ − PλBR−1λ BTPλ + λQ)dt−
n2∑
k=1
Ψk(t)dW0k(t), (4.10)
Pλ(T ) = λQf .
By Lemma A.1, we solve a unique Pλ ≥ 0 in L∞FW0 (0, T ;Sn) with Ψk ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Sn). Denote the
BSDE
dφ(t) =
[(
PλBR
−1
λ B
T −AT )φ+ Pλχ1 + χ2]dt+ Λ0dW0(t),
where φ(T ) = −(KT0f Xˆ⋆0 (T ) + (Mf − λQf )mˆ(T ) + νf ). We obtain a unique solution (φ,Λ0) in
L2FW0 (0, T ;R
n)× L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn×n2).
Lemma 4.7 We have ζai = Λ0 − [Ψ1Xˆ⋆i , . . . ,Ψn2Xˆ⋆i ] and ζbi = ζb := −PλD.
Proof. By the method in proving Lemma A.2, we can show qi is in fact given by −PλXˆ⋆i +φ. We
further obtain the relation
PλD + ζbi = 0, ζai = Λ0 − [Ψ1Xˆ⋆i , · · · ,Ψn2Xˆ⋆i ].
The lemma follows. 
5 Mean Field Social Optimum Solution
5.1 Consistency condition
So far we have assumed that u¯(t) ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1), as the approximation of uˇ(N)(t), is known for
solving the variational problems VP–(I) and VP–(II). Below we introduce a procedure to determine u¯.
Let VP–(II) be solved for i = 1, . . . , N , so that (4.6) determines
uˆ⋆i (t) = R
−1
λ B
T qi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
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Denote
q(N)(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
qi(t), uˆ
⋆(N)(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
uˆ⋆i (t), Xˆ
⋆(N)(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xˆ⋆i (t).
It is plausible to approximate u¯ by uˆ⋆(N)(t) = R−1λ B
T q(N)(t). We obtain
dq(N)(t) =
{
KT0 Xˆ
⋆
0 + (M − λQ)mˆ+ λQXˆ⋆(N) − F T0 p0
− F T p−AT q(N) + ν}dt+ ζ(N)a dW0(t) + 1N
N∑
i=1
ζbdWi(t),
where ζ
(N)
a =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ζai and ζb is given in Lemma 4.7.
Recall that mˆ was introduced to approximate Xˆ(N). Also, in view of Lemma 4.7, let ζ
(N)
a (t) be
approximated by ζa(t). When N →∞, the above equation of q(N) is approximated by
dq¯(t) =
(
KT0 Xˆ
⋆
0 +Mmˆ− F T0 p0 − F T p−AT q¯ + ν
)
dt+ ζadW0(t),
where q¯(T ) = −(KT0f Xˆ⋆0 (T ) +Mfmˆ(T ) + νf ). We solve a unique solution (q¯, ζa) ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn) ×
L2FW0 (0, T ;R
n×n2). The proof of the next lemma is straightforward and omitted here.
Lemma 5.1 We have q¯(t) = p(t) on [0, T ].
Now we introduce the following consistency condition
u¯ = R−1λ B
T p. (5.1)
We note that a fixed point property is embodied in (5.1). A similar situation also arises in mean
field games [19, 21]. Given a general u¯′ ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1), we solve VP–(I) to obtain a well-defined
adjoint process p ∈ L2FW0 (0, T ;Rn1), and we use an operator to denote Γ(u¯′) = R−1λ BTp. So (5.1) is
equivalent to the fixed point relation u¯ = Γ(u¯).
Typically in a mean field game with mixed players, one determines the consistency condition by
combining the solutions of the two optimization problems of the major player and a representative
minor player [17, 34, 35]. For the present problem, indeed we may determine u¯ via q¯ after solving
VP–(II). However, now p¯ and p coincide, and for this reason (5.1) is determined by the solution of
VP–(I) alone.
5.2 The system of FBSDEs
Substituting u¯ above into (4.6), we introduce the new system
dX̂⋆0 (t) = (A0X̂
⋆
0 + F0m̂+B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 p0)dt+D0dW0(t),
dm̂(t) = [GX̂⋆0 + (A+ F )m̂+BR
−1
λ B
T p]dt,
dp0(t) = (M0X̂
⋆
0 +K0m̂−AT0 p0 −GT p+ ν0)dt+ ξ0(t)dW0(t),
dp(t) = [KT0 X̂
⋆
0 +Mm̂− F T0 p0 − (A+ F )T p+ ν]dt+ ξ(t)dW0(t),
(5.2)
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where X̂⋆0 (0) = X
N
0 (0), m̂(0) = m0, p0(T ) = −(M0f X̂⋆0 (T ) +K0f m̂(T ) + ν0f ), p(T ) = −(KT0f X̂⋆0 (T ) +
Mfm̂(T ) + νf ); and its solution is used to define
χ̂1(t) = GX̂
⋆
0 (t) + Fm̂(t),
χ̂2(t) = K
T
0 X̂
⋆
0 (t) + (M − λQ)m̂(t)− F T0 p0(t)− F T p(t) + ν.
Note that (5.2) differs from (4.6) due to the elimination of u¯ by the consistency condition. To
distinguish the associated processes, we use the new notation X̂⋆0 and m̂ in (5.2) in place of Xˆ
⋆
0 and
mˆ. However, the variables p0, p are reused for the adjoint processes, and their identification should be
clear from the context.
We further introducedX̂⋆i (t) =
[
AX̂⋆i +BR
−1
λ B
T qi + χ̂1
]
dt+DdWi(t),
dqi(t) =
[
λQX̂⋆i −AT qi + χ̂2
]
dt+ ζai(t)dW0(t) + ζb(t)dWi(t),
(5.3)
where X̂⋆i (0) = X
N
i (0) and qi(T ) = −(KT0f X̂⋆0 (T ) + (Mf − λQf )m̂(T ) + λQf X̂⋆i (T ) + νf ).
Theorem 5.2 The FBSDE (5.2) has a unique solution (X̂⋆0 , m̂, p0, p, ξ0, ξ) in
L2FW0 (0, T ;R
4n)× L2FW0 (0, T ;R2n×n2),
and subsequently we uniquely solve (5.3) to obtain (X̂⋆i , qi, ζai, ζb) in
L2FW0,Wi (0, T ;R
2n)× L2FW0,Wi (0, T ;R2n×n2).
Proof. We follow the notation in (3.8)–(3.10) and further denote
X0 =
[
X̂⋆0
m̂
]
, B1 =
[
B0 0
0 B
]
, R1 =
[
R0 0
0 R
]
.
We rewrite the system (5.2) in the formdX0(t) =
[
A0X0(t) + B1R
−1
1 B
T
1Y0(t)
]
dt+D0dW0(t),
dY0(t) =
[
Q0X0(t)− AT0Y0(t) + v0
]
dt+ Z(t)dW0(t),
where Y0(T ) = −Q0fX0(T )− v0f . By Lemma A.2, we uniquely solve (X0,Y0, Z), and subsequently
(5.3). This completes the proof. 
Since Q0 ≥ 0 and Q0f ≥ 0, let (P ≥ 0,Ψ1, . . . ,Ψn2) be the unique solution to the BSRDE
−dP(t) = [P(t)A0 + AT0 P(t)−P(t)B1R−11 BT1 P(t) +Q0]dt−
n2∑
k=1
Ψk(t)dW0k(t), P0(T ) = Q0f .
We further uniquely solve
dϕ(t) =
[
− AT0 ϕ+P(t)B1R−11 BT1 ϕ+ v0 +
n2∑
k=1
ΦkD
col
0k
]
dt+ ΛdW0(t)
with the terminal condition ϕ(T ) = −v0f . Then we can write Y0(t) = −P(t)X0(t) + ϕ(t).
For (5.3), denote
X̂⋆(N)(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
X̂⋆i (t), q
(N)(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
qi(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
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Lemma 5.3 For (5.2) and (5.3), there exists a constant C independent of N such that
ǫ1,N := sup
0≤t≤T
E
(∣∣X̂⋆(N)(t)− m̂(t)∣∣2 + ∣∣q(N)(t)− p(t)∣∣2) ≤ C( 1N + |x(N)0 −m0|2).
Proof. Denote yN (t) = X̂
⋆(N)(t)− m̂(t) and rN (t) = q(N)(t)− p(t). We have
dyN (t) =
[
AyN (t) +BR
−1
λ B
T rN (t)
]
dt+
D
N
N∑
i=1
dWi(t),
drN (t) =
[
λQyN (t)−AT rN (t)
]
dt+ (ζ(N)a − ξ)dW0(t) +
ζb
N
N∑
i=1
dWi(t),
where rN (T ) = q
(N)(T ) − p(T ) = λQf (m̂(T ) − X̂⋆(N)(T )) = −λQfyN (T ). Let (Pλ,Ψ1, . . . ,Ψn2) be
solved from (4.10). Writing rN (t) = −Pλ(t)yN (t) + ψN (t), we obtain
dψN (t) =
(
Pλ(t)BR
−1
λ B
T −AT
)
ψN (t)dt+
n2∑
k=1
[ΨkyN + (ζ
(N)
a − ξ)colk ]dW0k +
PλD + ζb
N
N∑
i=1
dWi(t)
=
(
Pλ(t)BR
−1
λ B
T −AT
)
ψN (t)dt+
n2∑
k=1
[ΨkyN + (ζ
(N)
a − ξ)colk ]dW0k,
where ψN (T ) = q
(N)(T )− p(T )+λQyN (T ) = 0. Note that PλD+ ζb = 0 by Lemma 4.7. Take Z with
Zcolk = ΨkyN + (ζ
(N)
a − ξ)colk . Then (ψN , Z) is a solution of the linear BSDE. This implies ψN (t) = 0
and we further determine ΨkyN + (ζ
(N)
a − ξ)colk = 0. Next, by use of (A1) and rN (t) = −Pλ(t)yN (t),
we directly estimate sup0≤t≤T E
∣∣yN (t)∣∣2, which further gives a bound on sup0≤t≤T E∣∣rN (t)∣∣2 since Pλ
is an essentially bounded process. 
6 Asymptotic Social Optimality
Denote by Ucentr the set of centralized controls consisting of all u = (u0, u1, . . . , uN ), where each uj ∈
L2F (0, T ;R
n1). For a general u ∈ Ucentr, let the corresponding state processes be (XN0 ,XN1 , . . . ,XNN ).
We have the following equations
dXN0 (t) =(A0X
N
0 +B0u
N
0 + F0X
(N))dt+D0dW0(t),
dXNi (t) =(AX
N
i +Bu
N
i + FX
(N) +GXN0 )dt+DdWi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
We combine (5.2) and (5.3) to write the following FBSDE
dX̂⋆0 (t) =
(
A0X̂
⋆
0 + F0m̂+B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 p0
)
dt+D0dW0(t),
dm̂(t) =
[
GX̂⋆0 + (A+ F )m̂+BR
−1
λ B
T p
]
dt,
dX̂⋆i (t) =
(
AX̂⋆i +BR
−1
λ B
T qi + Fm̂+GX̂
⋆
0
)
dt+DdWi(t),
dp0(t) =
(
M0X̂
⋆
0 +K0m̂−AT0 p0 −GT p+ ν0
)
dt+ ξ0dW0(t),
dp(t) =
[
KT0 X̂
⋆
0 +Mm̂− F T0 p0 − (A+ F )T p+ ν
]
dt+ ξdW0(t),
dqi(t) =
[
KT0 X̂
⋆
0 + (M − λQ)m̂+ λQX̂⋆i − F T0 p0 − F T p−AT qi + ν
]
dt
+ζai(t)dW0(t) + ζb(t)dWi(t),
(6.1)
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where X̂⋆0 (0) = X
N
0 (0), m̂(0) = m0, X̂
⋆
i (0) = X
N
i (0), p0(T ) = −(M0fX̂⋆0 (T ) + K0f m̂(T ) + ν0f ),
p(T ) = −(KT0f X̂⋆0 (T ) +Mf m̂(T ) + νf ), qi(T ) = −(KT0f X̂⋆0 (T ) + (Mf − λQf )m̂(T ) + λQfX̂⋆i (T ) + νf ).
We use Theorem 5.2 to determine the unique solution (X̂⋆0 , m̂, X̂
⋆
i , p0, p, qi, ξ0, ξ, ζai, ζb
)
for (6.1).
Denote the set of individual controls
uˆN0 = R
−1
0 B
T
0 p0, uˆ
N
i = R
−1
λ B
T qi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
For uˆ =
(
uˆN0 , uˆ
N
1 , . . . , uˆ
N
N
)
, let the corresponding state processes be
(
XˆN0 , Xˆ
N
1 , . . . , Xˆ
N
N
)
.
dXˆN0 (t) =
(
A0Xˆ
N
0 +B0uˆ
N
0 + F0Xˆ
(N)
)
dt+D0dW0(t),
dXˆNi (t) =
(
AXˆNi +Buˆ
N
i + FXˆ
(N) +GXˆN0
)
dt+DdWi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
where XˆNj (0) = X
N
j (0) for 0 ≤ j ≤ N . It follows that
dXˆ(N)(t) =
[
(A+ F )Xˆ(N) +Buˆ(N) +GXˆN0
]
dt+
D
N
N∑
i=1
dWi(t). (6.2)
Denote X˜Nj (t) = X
N
j (t)− XˆNj (t), u˜Nj (t) = uNj (t)− uˆNj (t) for 0 ≤ j ≤ N , and
X˜(N) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
X˜Ni , u˜
(N) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
u˜Ni .
We obtain
dX˜N0 (t) =
(
A0X˜
N
0 +B0u˜
N
0 + F0X˜
(N)
)
dt, (6.3)
dX˜Ni (t) =
(
AX˜Ni +Bu˜
N
i + FX˜
(N) +GX˜N0
)
dt, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
dX˜(N)(t) =
[(
A+ F
)
X˜(N) +Bu˜(N) +GX˜N0
]
dt, (6.4)
where X˜N0 (0) = X˜
N
i (0) = X˜
(N)(0) = 0.
Denote
ǫ2,N = sup
0≤t≤T
E
(∣∣XˆN0 (t)− X̂⋆0 (t)∣∣2 + ∣∣Xˆ(N)(t)− m̂(t)∣∣2 + ∣∣uˆ(N)(t)− u¯(t)∣∣2),
where u¯ = R−1λ B
Tp and p is given by (6.1).
Lemma 6.1 We have
ǫ2,N = O
(
1
N + |x
(N)
0 −m0|2
)
.
Proof. Note that uˆ(N)(t)− u¯(t) = R−1λ BT
(
q(N)(t)− p(t)). Under (A1), Lemma 5.3 implies
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣uˆ(N)(t)− u¯(t)∣∣2 = O( 1N + |x(N)0 −m0|2).
Denote
y0(t) = Xˆ
N
0 (t)− X̂⋆0 (t), yN(t) = Xˆ(N)(t)− X̂⋆(N)(t).
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Then y0(t) and yN(t) satisfy the following linear ODE:
d
dt
[
y0(t)
yN (t)
]
=
[
A0 F0
G A+ F
][
y0(t)
yN (t)
]
+
[
F0
(
X̂⋆(N) − m̂)
F
(
X̂⋆(N) − m̂)
]
,
[
y0(0)
yN (0)
]
=
[
0
0
]
.
Since all the parameter processes are bounded and sup0≤t≤T E|X̂⋆(N)(t)−m̂(t)|2 ≤ C( 1N+|x
(N)
0 −m0|2)
by Lemma 5.3, the lemma follows. 
Now we are ready to state the asymptotic social optimality theorem.
Theorem 6.2 We have∣∣∣J (N)soc (uˆ)− inf
u∈Ucentr
J (N)soc (u)
∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
+ |x(N)0 −m0|
)
.
The importance of the theorem comes from the fact that the set of decentralized individual con-
trols (uˆ0, uˆ1, . . . , uˆN ) can optimize J
(N)
soc (u) with little optimality loss in comparison with centralized
controls. The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of this theorem.
6.1 Some Technical Lemmas
Denote
∆N0 (t) = (Xˆ
N
0 −Ψ0(Xˆ(N)))TQ0(X˜N0 −H0X˜(N)),
∆Ni (t) = (Xˆ
N
i −Ψ(XˆN0 , Xˆ(N)))TQ(X˜Ni −H1X˜N0 −H2X˜(N)),
∆N0f =
{
(XˆN0 −H0fXˆ(N) − η0f )TQ0f (X˜N0 −H0fX˜(N))
}
(T ),
∆Nif =
{
(XˆNi −H1fXˆN0 −H2fXˆ(N) − ηf )TQf (X˜Ni −H1fX˜N0 −H2fX˜(N))
}
(T ).
Lemma 6.3 For any u ∈ Ucentr, we have
J (N)soc (u) ≥ J (N)soc (uˆ) + 2E
∫ T
0
[
∆N0 +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
∆Ni +
(
uˆN0
)T
R0u˜
N
0 +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
(
uˆNi
)T
Ru˜Ni
]
dt
+ 2E
(
∆N0f +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
∆Nif
)
.
Proof. We check the integrands of J0 and Ji to obtain∣∣XN0 −Ψ0(X(N))∣∣2Q0 + (uN0 )TR0uN0
=
∣∣XˆN0 −Ψ0(Xˆ(N)) + X˜N0 −H0X˜(N)∣∣2Q0 + ∣∣uˆN0 + u˜N0 ∣∣2R0
≥ ∣∣XˆN0 −Ψ0(Xˆ(N))∣∣2Q0 + (uˆN0 )TR0uˆN0 + 2∆N0 + 2(uˆN0 )TR0u˜N0
and similarly, ∣∣XNi −Ψ(XN0 ,X(N))∣∣2Q + (uNi )TRuNi
≥
∣∣XˆNi −Ψ(XˆN0 , Xˆ(N))∣∣2Q + (uˆNi )TRuˆNi + 2∆Ni + 2(uˆNi )TRu˜Ni .
We further check the terminal costs in J0 and Ji to obtain the estimate. 
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We give a prior estimate on X˜0 and X˜
(N). By elementary estimate we can show that there exists
a constant Cˆ0 independent of N such that
J (N)soc (uˆ
N
0 , uˆ
N
1 . . . , uˆ
N
N ) ≤ Cˆ0.
For the estimate below it suffices to consider a set of individual controls u = (uN0 , . . . , u
N
N ) ∈ Ucentr
such that
J (N)soc (u
N
0 , u
N
1 , . . . , u
N
N ) ≤ Cˆ0. (6.5)
Denote all u satisfying (6.5) by the set U0.
Lemma 6.4 For all u ∈ U0, there exists C1 such that
sup
0≤t≤T
E
(∣∣X˜N0 (t)∣∣2 + |X˜(N)(t)∣∣2)dt ≤ C1.
Proof. By use of (A1)–(A3) and direct SDE estimates for (6.1) we can show that,
sup
0≤j≤N
E
∫ T
0
∣∣uˆNj (t)∣∣2dt ≤ C.
Thus for u ∈ U0 , we have
E
∫ T
0
∣∣u˜Nj (t)∣∣2dt ≤ 2E ∫ T
0
(∣∣uNj (t)∣∣2 + ∣∣uˆNj (t)∣∣2)dt ≤ 2E ∫ T
0
∣∣uNj (t)∣∣2dt+ C, 0 ≤ j ≤ N.
Since R0(t), R(t) ≥ c1I by (A1), (6.5) implies
E
∫ T
0
(∣∣u˜N0 (t)∣∣2 + ∣∣u˜(N)(t)∣∣2)dt ≤ 2E ∫ T
0
(∣∣uN0 (t)∣∣2 + 1N
N∑
i=1
∣∣uNi (t)∣∣2)dt+ C ≤ C2,
where C2 depends on Cˆ0.
By (6.3) and (6.4), we obtain for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
|X˜N0 (t)
∣∣+ ∣∣X˜(N)(t)∣∣ ≤ C ∫ T
0
(∣∣u˜N0 (t)∣∣+ ∣∣u˜(N)(t)∣∣)dt,
and by applying Schwarz inequality,
E
(∣∣X˜N0 (t)∣∣2 + ∣∣X˜(N)(t)∣∣2) ≤ CE ∫ T
0
(∣∣u˜N0 (t)∣∣2 + ∣∣u˜(N)(t)∣∣2)dt ≤ C1.
This completes the proof. 
Denote
Θ(t) =
{
(X˜N0 )
T (M0X̂
⋆
0 +K0m̂+ ν0) + uˆ
N
0 Ru˜
N
0
+ (X˜(N))T [KT0 X̂
⋆
0 + (M − λQ)m̂+ ν] +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
[(X˜Ni )
TQX̂⋆i + (u˜
N
i )
TRuˆNi ]
}
(t),
and
Θf =
{
(X˜N0 )
T (M0f X̂
⋆
0 +K0f m̂+ ν0f )
+ (X˜(N))T [KT0f X̂
⋆
0 + (Mf − λQf )m̂+ νf ] +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
(X˜Ni )
TQfX̂
⋆
i
}
(T ).
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Lemma 6.5 Suppose u ∈ Ucentr. Then
E
∫ T
0
Θ(t)dt+ EΘf + E
∫ T
0
[(X˜(N))TF T + (X˜N0 )
TGT ](q(N) − p)dt = 0. (6.6)
If, in addition, u ∈ U0, then
∣∣∣E ∫ T
0
Θ(t)dt+ EΘf
∣∣∣ ≤ C (E ∫ T
0
|q(N) − p|2dt
) 1
2
.
Proof. We have
d(pT0 X˜
N
0 ) =
[
(X˜N0 )
T (M0X̂
⋆
0 +K0m̂−GT p+ ν0) + pT0 (B0u˜N0 + F0X˜(N))
]
dt
+ (X˜N0 )
T ξ0dW0.
Then
E
∫ T
0
g1(t)dt+ E{(X˜N0 (T ))T (M0f X̂⋆0 (T ) +K0f m̂(T ) + ν0f )} = 0, (6.7)
where
g1(t) = (X˜
N
0 )
T (M0X̂
⋆
0 +K0m̂−GT p+ ν0) + pT0 (B0u˜N0 + F0X˜(N)).
By checking d( 1N
∑N
i=1 q
T
i X˜
N
i ), we obtain
E
∫ T
0
g2dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
{
(X˜Ni (T ))
T
[
KT0f X̂
⋆
0 (T ) + (Mf − λQf )m̂(T ) + λQfX̂⋆i (T ) + νf
]}
= 0, (6.8)
where
g2(t) =(X˜
(N))T [KT0 X̂
⋆
0 + (M − λQ)m̂− F T0 p0 − F T p+ ν + F T q(N)]
+ (X˜N0 )
TGT q(N) +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
(X˜Ni )
TQX̂⋆i +
1
N
N∑
i=1
(u˜Ni )
TBT qi.
Then
g1(t) + g2(t) = [(X˜
N
0 )
T (M0X̂
⋆
0 +K0m̂+ ν0) + uˆ
N
0 Ru˜
N
0 ]
+ (X˜(N))T [KT0 X̂
⋆
0 + (M − λQ)m̂+ ν]
+
λ
N
N∑
i=1
(X˜Ni )
TQX̂⋆i +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
(u˜Ni )
TRuˆNi
+ (X˜(N))TF T (q(N) − p) + (X˜N0 )TGT (q(N) − p)
= Θ + (X˜(N))TF T (q(N) − p) + (X˜N0 )TGT (q(N) − p).
By (6.7)–(6.8), we derive (6.6). The remaining part follows by applying Schwarz theorem and Lemma
6.4. 
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6.2 Proof of Theorem 6.2
We have
∆N0 +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
∆Ni
= (X˜N0 )
T
[
(Q0 + λH
T
1 QH1)Xˆ
N
0 − (Q0H0 + λHT1 Q(I −H2))Xˆ(N) + λHT1 Qη −Q0η0
]
+ (X˜(N))T [HT0 Q0H0 − λQH2 − λHT2 Q(I −H2)]Xˆ(N)
+ (X˜(N))T (λHT2 QH1 −HT0 Q0 − λQH1)XˆN0
+ (X˜(N))T (λHT2 Qη +H
T
0 Q0η0 − λQη)
+
λ
N
N∑
i=1
(XˆNi )
TQX˜Ni
= (X˜N0 )
T (M0Xˆ
N
0 +K0Xˆ
(N) + ν0) + (X˜
(N))T [(M − λQ)Xˆ(N) +KT0 XˆN0 + ν]
+
λ
N
N∑
i=1
(XˆNi )
TQX˜Ni .
Since
d
(
XˆNi (t)− X̂⋆i (t)
)
=
[
A(XˆNi − X̂⋆i ) + F (Xˆ(N) − m̂) +G(XˆN0 − X̂⋆0 )
]
dt,
and XˆNi (0)− X̂⋆i (0) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we obtain
XˆNi (t)− X̂⋆i (t) = Xˆ(N)(t)− X̂⋆(N)(t).
So
∆N0 +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
∆Ni +
(
uˆN0
)T
R0u˜
N
0 +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
(
uˆNi
)T
Ru˜Ni −Θ
= (X˜N0 )
T [M0(Xˆ
N
0 − X̂⋆0 ) +K0(Xˆ(N) − m̂)]
+ (X˜(N))T [KT0 (Xˆ
N
0 − X̂⋆0 ) + (M − λQ)(Xˆ(N) − m̂)]
+
λ
N
N∑
i=1
(X˜Ni )
TQ(XˆNi − X̂⋆i )
= (X˜N0 )
T [M0(Xˆ
N
0 − X̂⋆0 ) +K0(Xˆ(N) − m̂)]
+ (X˜(N))T [KT0 (Xˆ
N
0 − X̂⋆0 ) +M(Xˆ(N) − m̂)− λQ(X̂⋆(N) − m̂)]. (6.9)
In a similar manner, we can show
∆N0f +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
∆Nif −Θf =
{
(X˜N0 )
T [M0f (Xˆ
N
0 − X̂⋆0 ) +K0f (Xˆ(N) − m̂)] (6.10)
+ (X˜(N))T [KT0f (Xˆ
N
0 − X̂⋆0 ) +Mf (Xˆ(N) − m̂)− λQf (X̂⋆(N) − m̂)]
}
(T ).
It follows from (6.9)–(6.10) that
K1 :=
∣∣∣E ∫ T
0
[
∆N0 +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
∆Ni +
(
uˆN0
)T
R0u˜
N
0 +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
(
uˆNi
)T
Ru˜Ni
]
dt+ E(∆N0f +
λ
N
N∑
i=1
∆Nif )
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣E ∫ T
0
Θ(t)dt+ EΘf
∣∣∣+ CE ∫ T
0
φN (t)dt+ CEφN (T ),
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where φN (t) = {
(|X˜N0 | + |X˜(N)|)(|XˆN0 − X̂⋆0 | + |Xˆ(N) − m̂|+ |X̂⋆(N) − m̂|)}(t). Lemmas 6.4 and 6.5
imply that
K1 ≤ C(ǫ1,N + ǫ2,N )1/2.
By Lemma 6.3 and the above upper bound for K1, for all u ∈ U0, we have
J (N)soc (uˆ) ≤ J (N)soc (u) +O((ǫ1,N + ǫ2,N )1/2), (6.11)
which is automatically true when u is not in U0. Recalling Lemmas 5.3 and 6.1, we complete the
proof. 
7 Conclusion
This paper studies an LQ mean field social optimization problem with mixed players. The solution is
obtained by exploiting a person-by-person optimality principle and constructing two low dimensional
limiting variational problems. This method derives an FBSDE system for the major player and a
representative minor player. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the FBSDE and
establish asymptotic social optimality for the resulting decentralized controls of the N + 1 players.
Appendix A
Lemma A.1 [37, 25] Assume
i) {Wˆ (t) = [Wˆ1(t), . . . , Wˆl(t)]T , t ≥ 0} is an Rl-valued standard Brownian motion;
ii) {Aˆ(t), Bˆ(t), Qˆ(t), Rˆ(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T} are FWˆt -adapted essentially bounded processes and are Rk×k,
Rk×k1, Sk+, S
k1
+ -valued, respectively; Rˆ(t) ≥ αI for a deterministic constant α > 0; and Qˆf is Sk+-
valued, FWˆT -measurable, and essentially bounded.
Then the backward stochastic Riccati differential equation (BSRDE)−dP (t) =
(
AˆTP + PAˆ− PBˆRˆ−1BˆTP + Qˆ)(t)dt−∑li=1Ψi(t)dWˆi(t),
P (T ) = Qˆf
has a unique FWˆt -adapted solution (P,Ψ1, . . . ,Ψl) satisfying that P is Sk+-valued and essentially
bounded, and that each Ψi ∈ L2FWˆ (0, T ;S
k).
More general forms of this Riccati equation were studied in [37, sec. 5], [25, sec. 2], where Ψi
also appears linearly in the drift term. The proof method was presented in [37, sec. 5] by applying
quasi-linearization of the Riccati equation.
We further introduce the assumption
g, v ∈ L2FWˆ (0, T ;R
k), Dˆ ∈ L2FWˆ (0, T ;R
k×l), vf is FWˆT -measurable, E|vf |2 <∞. (A.1)
Consider the FBSDE dX(t) = (AˆX + BˆRˆ−1BˆY + g)dt+ DˆdWˆ (t),dY (t) = (QˆX − AˆTY + v)dt+ ZdWˆ (t), (A.2)
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where Y (T ) = −QˆfX(T )− vf and X(0) = x0 ∈ Rk.
Denote the linear BSDE
dψ(t) =
(− AˆTψ + PBˆRˆ−1BˆTψ + Pg + v + l∑
i=1
ΨiDˆ
col
i
)
dt+ ΛdWˆ (t),
where ψ(T ) = −vf . There exists a unique solution (ψ,Λ) ∈ L2FWˆ (0, T ;R
k)× L2FWˆ (0, T ;R
k×l).
Lemma A.2 Suppose the assumptions in Lemma A.1 and (A.1) hold, then (A.2) has a unique solu-
tion (X,Y,Z) in L2FWˆ (0, T ;R
2k)× L2FWˆ (0, T ;R
k×l), and
Y = −PX + ψ, Zcoli = Λcoli − PDˆcoli −ΨiX.
Proof. To show existence, consider the SDE
dX(t) = (AˆX + BˆRˆ−1Bˆ(−PX + ψ) + g)dt + DˆdWˆ (t), X(0) = x0,
which has a unique solution; we choose Y = −PX + ψ. By Itoˆ’s formula, we derive
dY = (QˆX − AˆTY + v)dt+
l∑
i=1
[Λcoli − PDˆcoli −ΨiX]dWˆi. (A.3)
We choose Zcoli = [Λ
col
i − PDˆcoli − ΨiX] for all i ≤ l. Then (X,Y,Z) constructed above is a solution
to (A.2).
To show uniqueness, suppose there is another solution (X ′, Y ′, Z ′). Denote X˜ = X−X ′, Y˜ = Y −Y ′
and Z˜ = Z − Z ′. So Y˜ (T ) = −QˆfX˜(T ). Denote Y˜ = −PX˜ + ϕ˜, where ϕ˜ is to be determined. By
Itoˆ’s formula,
dϕ˜ = (−AˆT ϕ˜+ PBˆRˆ−1BˆT ϕ˜)dt+ Z˜dWˆ +
l∑
i=1
ΨiX˜dWˆi,
where ϕ˜(T ) = 0. Note that X˜ has been given and (ϕ˜, Z˜) is a solution to the above linear BSDE. We
necessarily have ϕ˜ = 0 and Z˜coli = −ΨiX˜. We can further show X˜ = Y˜ = 0 and Z˜ = 0. This proves
uniqueness. 
Appendix B
Derivation of (4.3): We have the first order cost variation: For 1 ≤ j 6= i,
1
2δJj =
[
XˇNj −
(
H1Xˇ
N
0 +H2Xˇ
(N) + η
)]T 1
NQ
(
X˜Nj −H1X˜N0 −H2X˜(N)−i − 1NH2X˜Ni
)
.
By the fact that all X˜j , 1 ≤ j 6= i, are equal, we calculate
∆1 :=
∑
1≤j 6=i
(
XˇNj
)T 1
N λQ
(
X˜Nj −H1X˜N0 −H2X˜(N)−i − 1NH2X˜Ni
)
=
(
Xˇ
(N)
−i
)T
λQ
(
X˜Nj −H1X˜N0 −H2X˜(N)−i − 1NH2X˜Ni
)
=
(
Xˇ(N) − 1N XˇNi
)T
λQ
(
N
N−1X˜
(N)
−i −H1X˜N0 −H2X˜(N)−i − 1NH2X˜Ni
)
=
(
Xˇ(N) − 1N XˇNi
)T
λQ
(
(I −H2)X˜(N)−i −H1X˜N0 − 1NH2X˜Ni + 1N−1X˜
(N)
−i
)
,
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and
∆2 :=
∑
1≤j 6=i
(
H1Xˇ
N
0 +H2Xˇ
(N) + η
)T λ
NQ
(
X˜Nj −H1X˜N0 −H2X˜(N)−i − 1NH2X˜Ni
)
=
(
H1Xˇ
N
0 +H2Xˇ
(N) + η
)T
λQ
(
X˜
(N)
−i −H1X˜N0 −H2X˜(N)−i − 1NH2X˜Ni + 1N (H1X˜N0 +H2X˜
(N)
−i +
1
NH2X˜
N
i )
)
=
(
H1Xˇ
N
0 +H2Xˇ
(N) + η
)T
λQ
(
(I −H2)X˜(N)−i −H1X˜N0 − 1NH2X˜Ni + 1N (H1X˜N0 +H2X˜
(N)
−i +
1
NH2X˜
N
i )
)
.
We may write
λ
2N
N∑
j 6=i
δJj = ∆1 −∆2.
Subsequently, we determine the form of EN1 as in (4.3).
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